Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I join

you in welcoming this opportunity for the committee to examine

United States-Russian relations.

In recent months, newspaper stories have speculated about

whether our relations with Russia were descending to the point

where the cold war would return. Clearly, Washington and Moscow

have disagreed on many topics lately. We have disputed aspects of

policy related to energy security, missile defense, the Conventional

Forces in Europe Treaty, the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces

Treaty, democracy in general, human rights, Iran, Kosovo, Georgia,

Moldova, and other items.

While Americans prepare to celebrate Independence Day, President

Bush will be hosting Russian President Vladimir Putin in

Kennebunkport, Maine, and I applaud the President and his efforts

to engage his Russian counterpart. I encourage him to do so even

more regularly. The Kennebunkport meeting will not resolve all

disputes, but establishing a commitment to diplomacy is important.

The United States-Russia relationship is critical to the security and

prosperity of the international community. Kennebunkport provides

an opportunity for the two Presidents to give direction to

their bureaucracies and to lead our countries toward a stronger partnership.

During the last 15 years, United States-Russian relationships

have gone through geopolitical roller-coaster rides, but, throughout

the highs and lows, both sides have understood that our work confronting

the dangers of weapons of mass destruction was too important

to be sidelined. We have worked together to implement nuclear

and chemical arms-control treaties. The two countries cooperated

closely in the denuclearization of Ukraine, of Belarus, and

Kazakhstan, and, through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction

Program, we have dismantled more than 2,000 intercontinental

missiles, we eliminated 1,000 missile launchers, deactivated

7,000 nuclear warheads. In addition, our experts have worked together

to remove nuclear material from vulnerable locations

around the world, and to secure it in Russia. Such cooperation provides

a foundation on which to rebuild trust and confidence.

I urge the Presidents to solidify new areas of cooperation on

weapons of mass destruction. First, the United States and Russia

must extend the START I Treaty’s verification and transparency

elements, which will expire in 2009, and they should work to add

verification measures to the Moscow Treaty. Unfortunately, some

bureaucrats on both sides are balking at such efforts in favor of

less formal language that is not legally binding. I am concerned

that transparency and verification will suffer if legally binding regimes

are permitted to dissolve. The predictability and confidence

provided by treaty verification reduces the chances of misinterpretation,

miscalculation, and error.

The current U.S. policy is at odds with the Bush administration’s

assurances to Congress during consideration of the Moscow Treaty.

Secretary Rumsfeld and others testified that the START regime

would be utilized to bolster the Moscow Treaty, which did not include

verification measures. The current Russian-American relationship

is complicated enough without introducing more elements

of uncertainty into the nuclear relationship.

A second area of cooperation relates to the coming surge in global

demand for nuclear power, which may provide a pretext for more

nations to seek their own nuclear enrichment facilities. The spread

of this technology to additional states poses long-term risks for

both the United States and Russia. While the technology may be

intended to produce reactor fuel, it can also produce materials for

nuclear weapons. Both Presidents have offered plans to establish

nuclear fuel assurances.

Senator Biden and I have introduced Senate bill 1138, which proposes

that countries who give up their enrichment and reprocessing

programs have an assurance, either bilateral, multilateral, or both,

of nuclear reactor fuel at reasonable prices. Under such a regime,

nations would be prohibited from using the template of nuclear energy

to develop nuclear weapons. I remain hopeful that the chairman

will hold a hearing on this important subject.

Now, third, the United States and Russia should be exploring

how the Nunn-Lugar experience can be applied to North Korea.

While difficult diplomatic work remains, we must be prepared to

move forward quickly if the six-power talks succeed. The Nunn-

Lugar program would have a different orientation in North Korea

than it does in the former Soviet Union, but the program has the

authority, flexibility, and experience to adapt to the Korean situation.

Equally important, Moscow and Washington have proven that

former enemies can work together to achieve shared security benefits.

Such a track record will be critical to a successful diplomatic

process on the Korean Peninsula.

Fourth, Russia and the United States must come together to address

the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear weapons program. For too

long, our governments have been at odds over how to respond to

Tehran’s behavior. The differences in our approaches have narrowed

recently, and there are prospects for continued cooperation

between Moscow and Washington within the U.N. Security Council.

I am hopeful this renewed collaboration will extend to missile defense,

as well.

Other subjects must be discussed at Kennebunkport, but weapons

of mass destruction remain the No. 1 national security threat

to the United States and to Russia. Success in this area would enhance

international security and improve the prospects of United

States-Russian cooperation in other policy areas.

This year is the 200th anniversary of United States-Russian bilateral

relations and the 15th anniversary of the Nunn-Lugar program.

These anniversaries provide an occasion for both Moscow

and Washington to rededicate themselves to a close partnership to

address common challenges.

And I join in welcoming our very distinguished witnesses, each

of whom has been a very good friend of our committee, and I look

forward to their testimony.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I want to follow up on the chairman’s last question. In the last

few days the McClatchy News Service reported that administration

officials queried about the START regime’s coming to conclusion,

and what would follow it, indicated that we do want to know a lot

about what is going on, but we don’t need to know everything. This

was attributed to an unnamed administration official.

This is consistent with the testimony that the chairman and I

heard from former Under Secretary John Bolton, when he came before

the committee to testify on the Moscow Treaty. At that time,

we were told that the need to pin down and verify how many missiles,

submarines, bombers and warheads were being destroyed on

a month by month, or year by year basis, was an old-regime idea,

and not consistent with the views of this administration. Instead,

the administration was in a more modern phase. However, we were

reassured, those of us who were still fussing about these details,

that the START regime was still there, and it would govern this

process. But now, we find that the administration is not committed

to continuing the START regime in its current form. As you suggested,

it is the intent of the United States to replace verification

with a yet to be defined transparency whatever this may mean.

Now, from my standpoint, we appreciate the Department of Defense

sending to our office, every month, a scorecard of how many

warheads were separated from missiles, how many missiles, bombers,

and submarines were dismantled under the Nunn-Lugar Program.

Last month, nine warheads were deactivated. This is a small

detail in the midst of the 13,300 warheads Russia inherited from

the Soviet Union, but this is something in which, as a Senator, I’m

very much interested.

I hope the administration is as interested as I am, and the chairman

is, in ensuring that these weapons of mass destruction are destroyed.

I hope we are not in a situation that we’re saying, the

START Treaty was ‘‘not invented on my watch,’’ and, therefore, we

are prepared to let it expire in favor of a more ‘‘modern’’ idea of

transparency. I believe it is in U.S. national security interests to

know what and when Russia dismantles weapons systems under

their treaty obligations. The Russians probably need to know a

good bit about what we are doing, and that has been the basis of

our trust, back to the ‘‘trust, but verify’’ idea. I take verification

very seriously.

So, I appreciate you testifying to the chairman you’re not an expert

on this issue, but I’m hopeful that you will carry back to those

who are expert on the issue, that whatever they’re having to say

on these issues isn’t selling. And they need to know that these

issues need to be rectified soon, because START I is coming to an

end, and its continuation is important to many of us.

Do you have any further comment about this general issue?

Now, on a second issue, efforts are underway to

find common ground on both President Bush and President Putin’s

proposals on bilateral and multilateral nuclear reactor fuel assurances

to countries who forfeit enrichment and reprocessing regimes.

What is the current status of negotiations on a peaceful nuclear

cooperation agreement, a ‘‘123 agreement’’ with Russia? Are

discussions underway between the United States and Russia that

would set up a means to provide countries that forego dangerous

dual-use technology that could lead to potential weaponry, with nuclear

fuel services available at reasonable prices? Do you have any

general comment on progress in that area?

Well, that’s good news. And I know you’ll try to

keep the committee abreast with how that’s proceeding, because it’s

of intense interest to many of us here.

Let me ask, finally, currently Russia is engaged

in multilateral negotiations on WTO accession. What is the administration’s

view on Russian entry to the WTO? Do you believe this

would bring about greater transparency and rule of law in Russia?

What would be the repercussions should Congress not approve permanent

normal trade relations? Give us a general forecast on WTO.

Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary. The chairman is absent,

but he asked to join me in thanking you for your testimony

today, and your forthcoming responses to our questions for the

record. It is always great to have you before us.

The chairman asked me now to call before the committee our second

panel, and that will be composed of Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski

and General Brent Scowcroft. If those gentlemen would come to the

witness table, we would appreciate it, and we’ll proceed, then, with

their testimony.

Thank you.

Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

General Scowcroft, as you commented, there were some areas of

potential cooperation presented by President Putin in the speech

that Senator Isakson and you heard at the Munich Security Conference.

You pointed out that he mentioned cooperation on weapons

of mass destruction, with the goal of trying to bring proper controls

to weapons and materials. Likewise, the possibility of providing nuclear

fuel services to countries that are prepared to forego enrichment

and reprocessing technologies that could also be used for

weapons purposes. You suggested that perhaps no one was listening

to these proposals, but the chairman, Senator Isakson, and I

were. This is why we queried the previous witness about where our

administration is heading in these areas, where I believe there are

tremendous opportunities which are very important for our security,

as well as Russia’s.

You also indicated, however, that there are potential controversies

in so-called Russian space, as they see it, countries that are

near Russia or on their borders. Specifically on how we pursue energy

supplies for ourselves, as well as for our friends in NATO or

Europe, and it’s in this area that I really want you to comment.

How do we discuss with Russia the important work, for instance,

that Dr. Brzezinski is doing in a task force with former Minister

Volker Ruhe, of Germany. The group is advising Ukraine on how

it might progress at a very difficult time in that country’s development?

Or, those of us who have been visiting frequently in Georgia,

with a government there that certainly counts upon our understanding

and support. Similarly, our strong support for the Baku-

Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline that travels through Georgia and perhaps,

in the future, connecting with Kazakhstan and other energy

sources further east. What is an appropriate way to approach Russians

on these subjects without presenting an in-your-face-type

strategy? These issues are important to us, and we do not hide

that. And we need to engage with Russia in a dialogue on these

subjects, in addition to other areas in which we might seek cooperation.

Dr. Brzezinski, would you want to comment on

Ukraine, specifically, and the difference of opinion that apparently

you have with General Scowcroft?

I thank you both.